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1 Abstract
We discuss the objectives of any endeavor in creating artificial intelligence, AI, and provide a possible
alternative. Intelligence might be an unintended consequence of curiosity left to roam free, best exemplified
by a frolicking infant. This suggests that our attempts at AI could have been misguided; what we actually
need to strive for can be termed artificial curiosity, AC, and intelligence happens as a consequence of those
efforts. For this unintentional yet welcome aftereffect to set in a foundational list of guiding principles needs
to be present. We start with the intuition for this line of reasoning and formalize it with a series of definitions,
assumptions, ingredients, models and iterative improvements that will be necessary to make the incubation
of intelligence a reality. Our discussion provides conceptual modifications to the Turing Test and to Searle’s
Chinese room argument. We discuss the future implications for society as AI becomes an integral part of life.
We provide a road-map for creating intelligence with the technical parts relegated to the appendix so
that the article is accessible to a wider audience. The central techniques in our formal approach to creating
intelligence draw upon tools and concepts widely used in physics, cognitive science, psychology, evolutionary
biology, statistics, linguistics, communication systems, pattern recognition, marketing, economics, finance,
information science and computational theory highlighting that solutions for creating artificial intelligence
have to transcend the artificial barriers between various fields and be highly multi-disciplinary.
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2 The Benchmark for Brainpower
As a first step, we recognize that one possible categorization of different fields can be done by the set of
questions a particular field attempts to answer. Since we are the creators of different disciplines but not the
creators of the world (based on our present state of understanding) in which these fields need to operate,
the answers to the questions posed by any domain can come from anywhere or from phenomenon studied
under a combination of many other disciplines. Hence, the answers to the questions posed under the realm
of artificial intelligence (AI) can come from seemingly diverse subjects such as: physics, biology, psychology,
mathematics, chemistry, marketing, engineering, economics, literature, theater, music and so on1.
This suggests that we might be better off identifying ourselves with problems and solutions, which tacitly
confers upon us the title Problem Solvers; instead of calling ourselves physicists, biologists, psychologists,
mathematicians, engineers, chemists, marketing experts, economists and so on. It would not be entirely
incorrect to state that the majority of the attempts at solving problems start with posing well defined
questions and finding corresponding answers. As we linger on the topic of Questions & Answers, Q&A, we
need to be cognizant that any answer we wish to seek would depend on some Definitions and Assumptions,
D&A. But it is absolutely essential to keep in mind that if we change those D&A we might get different Q&A
(End-note 1). Hence in later sections, we start with a definition of intelligence and highlight the assumptions
and criteria under which we attempt to seek the answers for questions related to the creation of intelligence.
The problem of designing intelligence artificially can be a rather trivial task depending on which organism’s
brainpower acts as our gold standard. For simplicity and to be specific, we could confine the creation of
intelligence outside the confines of biological organisms; but it will become clear later on that many parts of
our discussion apply to the goals of increasing intelligence within biological organisms as well; not to mention
a suitable definition, as discussed above, could render biological and non-biological organisms under the
same category of sentient beings. We discuss the objectives of any endeavor in creating artificial intelligence
(Sections 2.1; 2.2; 2.3), AI, and provide a possible alternative.
Intelligence might be an unintended consequence of curiosity left to roam free, best exemplified by a frolick-
1 Numerous seminar participants suggested ways to improve the manuscript. The views and opinions expressed in this article,
along with any mistakes, are mine alone and do not necessarily reflect the official policy, or, position of either of my affiliations,
or, any other agency. Dr. Yong Wang, Dr. Isabel Yan, Dr. Vikas Kakkar, Dr. Fred Kwan, Dr. William Case, Dr. Srikant
Marakani, Dr. Qiang Zhang, Dr. Costel Andonie, Dr. Jeff Hong, Dr. Guangwu Liu, Dr. Humphrey Tung and Dr. Xu Han at
the City University of Hong Kong; Dr. Richard Sylla, Dr. Adam Brandenburger, Dr. Richard Freedman, Dr. Robert Engle,
Prof. Larry Zicklin, Prof. Seth Freeman, Dr. Laura Veldkamp, Dr. Ignacio Esponda at New York University; Dr. Liam Lenten
at La Trobe University; and Dr. Paul Joseph, Dr. M. N. Neelakantan, Dr. V. K. Govindan, Dr. Moiuddin Kutty, Dr. M.P.
Sebastian, Mr. Murali Krishnan at the National Institute of Technology Calicut; faculty members of SolBridge International
School of Business; provided valuable suggestions to explore and where possible apply cross disciplinary techniques.
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ing infant (Section 2.4). This suggests that our attempts at AI could have been misguided, what we actually
need to strive for can be termed artificial curiosity, AC, and intelligence happens as a consequence of those
efforts.
For this unintentional yet welcome aftereffect to set in a foundational list of guiding principles needs to
be present (Section 3). We discuss what these essential doctrines might be and why their establishment
is required to form connections, possibly growing, between a knowledge store that has been built up and
new pieces of information that curiosity will bring back. As more findings are acquired and more bonds are
fermented, we need a way to periodically reduce the amount of data; in the sense, it is important to capture
the critical characteristics of what has been accumulated or produce a summary of what has been gathered.
We start with the intuition for this line of reasoning and formalize it with a series of definitions, as-
sumptions, ingredients, models and iterative improvements that will be necessary to make the incubation
of intelligence a reality. Section (4) provides a road-map for creating intelligence with the technical parts
relegated to Appendix (8), which has the mathematical elements for creating intelligence and can be incorpo-
rated into suitable algorithms or machine learning systems. This approach ensures that the paper is written
in a non-technical language to facilitate understanding by a wide audience and is accessible by almost anyone
interested in AI; while the appendices provide sufficient rigor to enable technological implementations of the
ideas. Our discussion provides conceptual modifications to the Turing Test and to Searle’s Chinese room
argument (Sections 3.2; 3.3; 3.4).
The central techniques in our formal approach to creating intelligence draw upon tools and concepts
widely used in physics, cognitive science, psychology, evolutionary biology, statistics, linguistics, communi-
cation systems, pattern recognition, marketing, economics, finance, information science and computational
theory. This highlights that solutions “for creating artificial intelligence” have to “transcend the artificial
barriers” between various fields and be highly multi-disciplinary. In addition, since every field will benefit
from increased intelligence, the question of creating intelligence belongs to every discipline. We consider
many unintended consequences, one of the main themes of this paper, in the quest for intelligence and the
future implications for society as AI becomes an integral part of life.
2.1 Questionably Simple Yet Complex Benchmark
As we embark on the journey to apply the knowledge from other fields to AI we need to be aware that ar-
tificial intelligence is “Simply Too Complex”, since through time AI has just been about beating a benchmark.
The complications are mainly to select the right standards to compete with. This problem is compounded
due to the fact that nobody really knows what is intelligence, especially when considering artificial systems:
(Legg & Hutter 2007) take a number of well known informal definitions of human intelligence and extract their
essential features, which are then mathematically formalized to produce a general measure of intelligence.
To facilitate a reference point for the rest of the article we define intelligence as below. This additional
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attempt perhaps compounds the prevailing confusion; Section (3.1) clarifies why this might still be a positive
outcome.
Definition 1. Intelligence is the ability to connect elements of previously attained information to effect a
decision. Nothing lasts forever and hence, no decision is good forever; but the longer a decision serves its
purpose, the greater the intelligence of the agent making that decision.
With this definition it is implied that even a very intelligent decision, (such as in a game of chess), that falls
short of meeting its objective, since it has to counter a decision with greater intelligence, fails the benchmark.
Intelligence is with respect to the situation and its demands, highlighting that we can only make relative
comparisons of intelligence. It should also become clear that intelligence requires the ability to collect pieces
of information and to connect them towards a decision making goal. Since decisions are not going to be valid
indefinitely (this could be stated explicitly as an assumption), we need to continue to use these abilities. The
notion of connecting known pieces of information to obtain a new combination is extensively studied under
the heading of innovation and is acknowledged as the key process behind creativity (Young 1965). We further
restrict our discussion to the sub class of living organisms, termed the homo sapiens and the agents being
created by them using computers and related software to possess intelligence. We specifically check how this
definition can be applied in the context of the Turing Test in Section (3.2).
With no disrespect to any adults, it would not be entirely wrong to label children as better and faster
learners than adults. (Holt 2017) shows that in most situations our minds work best when we use them in a
certain way, and that young children tend to learn better than grownups (and better than they themselves
will when they are older) because they use their minds in a special way, which is a style of learning that fits
their present condition.
(Russell & Norvig 1995) is a comprehensive discussion of the concept of an intelligent agent. (Wooldridge
& Jennings 1995) discuss the most important theoretical and practical issues associated with the design
and construction of intelligent agents. They divide these issues into three areas (clearly any division cannot
completely rule out overlap between the components).
1. Agent theory is concerned with the question of what an agent is, and the use of mathematical formalisms
for representing and reasoning about the properties of agents.
2. Agent architectures is about the software engineering models of agents; this area is primarily concerned
with the problem of designing software or hardware systems that will satisfy the properties specified
by agent theorists.
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3. Agent languages are software systems for programming and experimenting with agents; these languages
may embody principles proposed by theorists.
Neural networks are one approach to artificial intelligence (AI) that are modeled on the brain (Haykin 1998;
Haykin 2009; Castelvecchi 2016). These systems, loosely inspired by the densely interconnected neurons of
the brain, mimic human learning by changing the strength of simulated neural connections on the basis of
experience. Unfortunately, such networks are also as opaque as the brain, though they promised to be better
than standard algorithms at dealing with complex real-world situations. Instead of storing what they have
learned in a neat block of digital memory, they diffuse the information in a way that is exceedingly difficult
to decipher.
Deep learning is a three-decade-old technique in which massive amounts of data and processing power
help computers to crack messy problems that humans solve almost intuitively, from recognizing faces to
understanding language (Jones 2014; LeCun, Bengio & Hinton 2015). Such methods fall under a broader
category termed machine learning, which aims to program computers to use example data or past experience
to solve a given problem (Alpaydin 2014). Using the data to decipher patterns is also known as training
the system. Deep learning models are built as artificial neural networks and use a cascade of multiple layers
of nonlinear processing units, allowing computational models to learn representations of data with multiple
levels of abstraction. Each successive layer uses the output from the previous layer as input. (Deng & Yu
2014) is overview of deep learning methodologies and their applications to a variety of information processing
tasks. (Schmidhuber 2015) is a comprehensive survey about deep learning in neural networks.
2.2 Intelligence for What Sake?
To be precise, this section is not about creating intelligence to barter for the Japanese drink (though that
seems like a wise exchange and might have been done many times before).
A central aspect of our lives is uncertainty and our struggle to overcome it. Over the years, it seems that
we have found ways to understand the uncertainty in the natural world by postulating numerous physical
laws. The majority of the predictions in the physical world hold under a fairly robust set of circumstances
and cannot be influenced by the person making the observation, and they stay unaffected if more people
become aware of such a possibility. In the social sciences, the situation is exactly the contrary. (Popper 2002)
gave a critique and warned of the dangers of historical prediction in social systems.
We need intelligent decision making because of the uncertainty in the world we live in. Hence perhaps,
the one central theme in this entire article is Uncertainty. The dynamic nature of the social sciences, where
changes can be observed and decisions can be taken by participants to influence the system, means that
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along with better models and predictive technologies, predictions need to be continuously revised; and yet
unintended consequences set in (Kashyap 2016); and as long as participants are free to observe the results
and modify their actions, this effect will persist.
A hall mark of the social sciences is the lack of objectivity. Here we assert that objectivity is with respect
to comparisons done by different participants and that a comparison is a precursor to a decision.
Assumption 1. Despite the several advances in the social sciences, we have yet to discover an objective
measuring stick for comparison, a so called, True Comparison Theory, which can be an aid for arriving at
objective decisions.
For our present purposes, the lack of such an objective measure means that the difference in comparisons,
as assessed by different participants can effect different decisions under the same set of circumstances. Hence,
despite all the uncertainty in the social sciences, the one thing we can be almost certain about is the subjectiv-
ity in all decision making. This lack of an objective measure for comparisons, makes people react at varying
degrees and at varying speeds, as they make their subjective decisions. A decision gives rise to an action and
subjectivity in the comparison means differing decisions and hence unpredictable actions. This inability to
make consistent predictions in the social sciences explains the growing trend towards comprehending better
and deciphering the decision process and the subsequent actions, by collecting more information across the
entire cycle of comparisons, decisions and actions.
Another feature of the social sciences is that the actions of participants affects the state of the system,
effecting a state transfer which perpetuates another merry-go-round of comparisons, decisions and actions
from the participants involved. This means, more the participants, more the changes to the system, more
the actions and more the information that is generated to be gathered. Hence perhaps, an unintended
consequence of the recent developments in technology has been to increase the complexity in our lives in
many ways.
(Simon 1962) points out that any attempt to seek properties common to many sorts of complex systems
(physical, biological or social), would lead to a theory of hierarchy since a large proportion of complex systems
observed in nature exhibit hierarchic structure; that a complex system is composed of subsystems that, in
turn, have their own subsystems, and so on.
This might hold a clue to the marvel that our minds perform; abstracting away from the dots that make up
a picture, to fully visualizing the image, that seems far removed from the pieces that give form and meaning
to it. To help us gain a better understanding of the relationships between different elements of information,
as we will see in Section (8), we use a metric built from smaller parts, but gives optimal benefits when seen
from a higher level. Contrary to what conventional big picture conversations suggest, as the spectator steps
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back and the distance from the picture increases, the image becomes smaller yet clearer.
(McManus & Hastings 2005) clarify the wide range of uncertainties that affect complex engineering systems
and present a framework to understand the risks (and opportunities) they create and the strategies system
designers can use to mitigate or take advantage of them. (Lawson 1985) argues that the Keynesian view on
uncertainty (that it is generally impossible, even in probabilistic terms, to evaluate the future outcomes of
all possible current actions; Keynes 1937; 1971; 1973), far from being innocuous or destructive of economic
analysis in general, can give rise to research programs incorporating, amongst other things, a view of rational
behavior under uncertainty, which could be potentially fruitful.
These viewpoints hold many lessons for AI designers and could be instructive for researchers looking
to create methods to compare and build complex systems, keeping in mind the caveats of dynamic social
systems.
2.3 Minds versus Machines
We currently lack a proper understanding of how, in some instances, our brains (or minds; and right now,
it seems, we don’t know the difference!) make the leap of learning from information to knowledge to wisdom
(See Mill 1829; Mazur 2015 for more about learning and behavior). A simple criterion for the problem of
creating artificial intelligence would make it a child’s play. Perhaps, the real challenge is to replicate the
curiosity and learning an infant displays. Intellect might be a byproduct of Inquisitiveness, demonstrating
another instance of an unintended yet welcome consequence (Kashyap 2016). If ignorance is bliss, intrusion
might just be the opposite and bring misery. As the saying goes, Curiosity Terminated the Cat and . . . the
movie Terminator should tell us about other unintended consequences that might pop up in the AI adventure:
(Cameron & Wisher 1991).
This brings up the question of Art and Science in the creation of AI (and everything else in life?); which
are more related than we probably realize, “Art is Science that we don’t know about; Science is Art restricted
to a set of symbols governed by a growing number of rules” (End-note 4). While the similarities between art
and science should give us hope, we need to face the realities of the situation. Right now, arguably in most
cases, we (including computers and intelligent machines?) can barely make the jump from the information
to the knowledge stage even with the use of cutting (bleeding?) edge technology and tools. This exemplifies
three things:
1. We are still in the information age. As a route to establishing this, consider this: Information is Hidden;
Knowledge is Exchanged or Bartered; Wisdom is Dispersed. Surely we are still in the Information Age
since a disproportionate amount of our actions are geared towards accumulating unique data-sets for
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the sole benefits of the accumulators.
2. Automating the movement to a higher level of learning, which is necessary for dealing with certain
doses of uncertainty, is still far away.
3. Some of us missed the memo that the best of humanity are actually robots in disguise, living amongst
us.
Hence, it is not Mind versus Machine (Not even, Man versus Machine or MAN vs MAC, in short; for
the underlying concepts on which modern computers are built and what the future holds see: Davis 2011;
Perrier, Sipper & Zahnd 1996; Denning 2005; Amir, Ben-Ishay,Levner, Ittah, Abu-Horowitz & Bachelet
2014; Thompson, Gokler, Lloyd & Shor 2016; End-notes 5; 7). Not even MAN and MAC against the MPC
(Microsoft Personal Computer: Freiberger & Swaine 1999; Garland 1977; Campbell-Kelly 2001; Manes &
Andrews 1993; Carlton & Annotations-Kawasaki 1997; Wonglimpiyarat 2012; Corcoran, Coughlin & Wozniak
2016; End-notes 8; 9; 10)? It is MAN, MAC and the MPC against increasing complexity! (Also in scope
are other computing platforms from the past, present and the future: Williams 1997; Ifrah, Harding, Bellos
& Wood 2000; Leuenberger & Loss 2001; Ceruzzi 2003; Armbrust, Fox, Griffith, Joseph, Katz, Konwinski
& Zaharia 2010; Zhang, Cheng & Boutaba 2010; End-notes 11; 12; 13; 14). This increasing complexity and
information explosion is perhaps due to the increasing number of complex actions perpetrated by the actors
that comprise the social system. The human mind will be obsolete if machines can fully manage society and
we might have bigger problems on our hands than who is taking care of things. We need, and will continue
to need, massive computing power and all the intelligence we can create to mostly separate the signal from
the noise. In this age of (Too Much) Information, it is imperative for Man and Machine to work together to
uncover nuggets of knowledge from buckets of nonsense.
2.4 Becoming Smarter than Albert Einstein!
If our goal is to create artificial intelligence, (or anything else), we should aim for the sky, in the hope
that we might at-least end up reaching the treetops. This takes us to the central assumption of this paper,
which then becomes the ultimate benchmark to beat for any intelligent system.
Assumption 2. Albert Einstein is the most intelligent human being that has ever lived. It has been remarked,
albeit anecdotally, that his Intelligence Quotient (IQ) was between 160 to 190, give or take a few points. For
simplicity, and perhaps also because Albert Einstein is more well know than other super smart individuals,
we overlook the fact that other people have recorded higher levels of IQ.
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We completely stay away from the debate about the limitations of using IQ as an indicator of intelligence
(Weinberg 1989; Bartholomew 2004 describe the status of controversies regarding the definition of intelligence,
whether intelligence exists and, if it does, whether it can be measured, and the relative roles of genes versus
environments in the development of individual differences in intelligence) since it will not make a conceptual
difference for our discussion. (Ceci & Liker 1986) suggest that IQ is unrelated to skilled performance at the
racetrack and to real-world forms of cognitive complexity that would appear to conform to some of those
that scientists regard as the hallmarks of intelligent behavior. (DeDonno 2016) find that IQ fails to predict
certain aspects of learning of Hold’em poker, a game of skill with significant complexity attributes resembling
real-life activities such as stock market investing and shopping for a home. For the importance not only of
conventional analytical intelligence but also skills such as common sense, creativity, knowledge that is usually
not expressed or taught, and wisdom (not captured or hard to measure using presently known standardized
tests), needed for real world problem solving, see: (Okuda, Runco & Berger 1991; Wagner & Sternberg 1985;
Sternberg 2018).
A few other interesting viewpoints are below. This includes intelligence in man-made systems, which
includes the possibility that our world was created by some of us from the future or even the past, after we
have evolved to transcend time. (Hernández-Orallo & Dowe 2010) discuss the idea of a universal anytime
intelligence test, that is a test that should be able to measure the intelligence of any biological or artificial
system that exists at this time or in the future. (Martínez-Plumed, Ferri, Hernández-Orallo & Ramírez-
Quintana 2017) warn about the need to be careful when applying human test problems to assess the abilities
and cognitive development of robots and other artificial cognitive systems. (Hernández-Orallo, Martínez-
Plumed, Schmid, Siebers & Dowe 2016) contend that there is poor understanding about what intelligence tests
measure in machines and whether they are useful to evaluate AI systems, concluding that AI is still lacking
general techniques to deal with a variety of problems at the same time though a more careful understanding
of what intelligence tests offer for AI may help build new bridges between psycho-metrics, cognitive science,
and AI. Though we believe that casting a wider net across all artificial disciplines is necessary as discussed
in Section (2).
If we then make the simplifying assumption that if we are somehow able to capture all other attributes
and higher dimensions of intelligence, (or desirable features for solving problems), that help to deal with the
uncertainty in our lives into a single numeric score (and call it IQ, which could still be Intelligence Quotient
or we could name it Infinite-Intellect Quest or Imagination Quotient or better still, Involvement Quotient,
for lack of an even better term), we could state that: we live in a world that requires around 2000 IQ points
to consistently make correct decisions (End-note 21). But the problem is that the best of us, by Assumption
(2) above, has less than 200 IQ points. Hence perhaps, we need someone like IQ-Man who is friends with
Super-Man (for society’s fascination with superheroes or super-humans see: Eco & Chilton 1972; Reynolds
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1992; Fingeroth 2004; Haslem, Ndalianis & Mackie 2007; Coogan 2009). But since these supreme beings are
nowhere to be found (Super-Man at-least can be seen in movies; IQ-Man is truly, as of now, nowhere to be
found), the rest of us could use the clues mentioned below (both for dealing with our problems and to create
intelligence in machines) towards a possible solution to the question: Can we become smarter than Albert
Einstein?
1. The Miraculous Circle of Trial and Error
(a) With each try and subsequent failure, we learn a way to improve and move closer to success. Each
improvement brings a better way to accomplish something, or in a way enhanced IQ. But success
lasts only till it will fail, and we need to try something else and start all over again (Ismail 2014;
End-note 21).
2. Lessons from other Relevant Episodes in History
(a) The errors need not all be due to our efforts. We can learn from instances, where similar things
have been tried and see what we can glean from the mistakes of others (For excellent introductions
on the lessons history holds, see: Durant 1968; Malomo, Idowu & Osuagwu 2006).
3. Team Work
(a) If a team of agents has the common purpose of accomplishing something, the effect is increased
intelligence, as long as, no one is looking to sabotage the efforts of others. This is also known as
the wisdom of the crowd (Giles 2005). What one person might overlook, another might notice
with the overall effect, that the betterment of everyone involved, is accomplished.
4. Insatiable Curiosity and the Desire to Learn
(a) Any agent, that continues to be overwhelmingly curious (Reio Jr, Petrosko, Wiswell & Thong-
sukmag 2006 discuss the conceptualization and measurement of curiosity; also see: Loewy 1998;
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Loewenstein 1994; Berlyne 1954; 1966; Litman & Spielberger 2003), which will lead to collect-
ing new pieces of information, might continue to have an uptick in the overall intelligence. This
suggests that our attempts at AI could have been misguided, what we actually need to strive for
can be termed artificial curiosity and intelligence happens as a consequence of those efforts. But
this requires certain basic things to be established, which we will discuss informally in Section (3)
and more formally in our road-map for intelligence in Section (8) and provide the mathematical
elements in Appendix (8).
(Gopnik, Meltzoff & Kuhl 1999) argue that evolution designed us to both teach and learn, indicating that
nurture is our nature, and the drive to learn is our most important instinct (perhaps as important as, or,
even more important, than our instinct to survive). They reason that even very young children, as well as
adults, use some of the same methods that scientists use to conduct research, and to learn about the world.
(Campbell 1956) notes a formal parallel between some of the characteristics of organic evolution and trial
and error learning.
Any discussion of children and grownups is incomplete without making explicit when does childhood end?
Here, we are not asking what is childhood, since that is perhaps harder to define, but it would be a safe
assumption that most humans have somewhat of a childhood, however brief that might be.
Definition 2. The end of childhood is when curiosity and confidence are overtaken by the other concerns
that life brings.
New data show that infants use computational strategies to detect the statistical and prosodic patterns in
language input, and that this leads to the discovery of phonemes and words (Kuhl 2004). (Oja 1982) derives a
new class of unconstrained learning rules using a simple linear neuron model and shows that the model neuron
tends to extract the principal component from a stationary input vector sequence. For more about models
on neuron activity and the many roles that have been assigned to individual neurons from computational
machines to analog signal processors, see: (McCulloch & Pitts 1943; Nass & Cooper 1975; Takeuchi & Amari
1979).
Language and learning is most likely to be a two way street, in the sense that the rules by which infants
perceive information, the ways in which they learn words, the social contexts in which language is commu-
nicated and the need to remember the learned entities for a long time, probably influenced the evolution of
language (Kuhl 2004).
(Bush & Mosteller 1955; 2006) present a mathematical model for simple learning. Changes in the prob-
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ability of occurrence of a response in a small time are described with the aid of mathematical operators.
The parameters which appear in the operator equations are related to experimental variables such as the
amount of reward and work. (LeBlanc & Weber-Russell 1996) present a computer simulation designed to
capture the working memory demands required in the comprehension of arithmetic word problems, based on
the belief that understanding arithmetic word problems involves a complex interaction of text comprehension
and mathematical processes.
Criterion 1. To learn anything, any agent first needs to learn a medium through which the learning can
occur. Simply put, to start to learn, we first need to learn a language.
(Lenneberg 1967) hypothesized that language could be acquired only within a critical period, extending from
early infancy until puberty: “the coming of language occurs at about the same age in every healthy child
throughout the world, strongly supporting the concept that genetically determined processes of maturation,
rather than environmental influences, underlie capacity for speech and verbal understanding”.
(Johnson & Newport 1989) try to check whether it should be the case that young children are better
second language learners than adults and should consequently reach higher levels of final proficiency in the
second language. By testing the English proficiency attained by 46 native Korean or Chinese speakers, who
had arrived in the United States between the ages of 3 and 39, and who had lived in the United States
between 3 and 26 years by the time of testing, the conclusion that a critical period for language acquisition
extends its effects, to second language acquisition, was supported. (Newport 1990) considers evidence from
several studies of both first and second language acquisition suggesting that normal language learning occurs
only when exposure to the language begins early in life.
(Sutton & Barto 1998) provide an excellent introduction to understand intuitively the ideas of reinforce-
ment learning and the general connection between its parts. They define reinforcement learning as learning
what to do, how to map situations to actions, so as to maximize a numerical reward signal.
It is interesting to note, that there is contrasting evidence. (Snow & Hoefnagel-Höhle 1978) test the
hypothesis, that second language acquisition will be relatively fast, successful, and qualitatively similar to
first language only if it occurs before the age of puberty, by studying the naturalistic acquisition of Dutch
by English speakers of different ages. It was found that the subjects in the age groups 12-15 and adults
made the fastest progress during the first few months of learning Dutch and that at the end of the first year,
(the subjects were tested 3 times during their first year in Holland to assess several aspects of their second
language ability), the 8-10 and 12-15-year-olds had achieved the best control of Dutch. The 3-5 year-olds
scored lowest on all the tests employed. These data do not support the critical period hypothesis for language
acquisition.
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A point we need to keep in mind is that perhaps, English language (and many languages), especially
its pronunciations and grammar are not the easiest to learn due to the many nuances it has that do not
generalize easily. It would then make sense to develop a language that is more structured and free of
ambiguity. (Stageberg 1968) has a discussion of structural ambiguity with some examples (End-note 15).
3 A Journey to the Land of Unintended Consequences
A glimpse of what a journey towards the land of unintended consequences holds can be seen by reminding
ourselves that all knowledge creation is but an unintended consequence. We start with an attempt to
understand the papers written by others, (literature review of knowledge already created or experiments
performed under what conditions) and end up with papers of our own (results that add what is missing
or suggest improvements). Although to be precise, as researchers, we do want to intentionally create new
knowledge, but the exact new knowledge we end up creating is unintentional; we stumble upon it as we
wander around the knowledge that is already in place. This is simply because, our intentions can only cater
to what we already know, or, to existing knowledge; new knowledge, which is unknown, has to come from
the realm of the unintentional.
3.1 I Don’t Know, A Great Answer
(Taleb 2007) in his landmark book, the Black Swan, talks about the unread books in the personal library
of legendary Italian writer, Umberto Eco, and how over time, this unread collection gets larger. Hence, it
would not be incorrect, to say that, there is more that, we don’t know, than, what we know; the more we
know, the more, there will be to know. But that should not stop us and the agent, from trying to seek the
answers, or, even from making a guess, as a starting point.
Hence, an answer admitting, “I Don’t Know”, is a great answer in most situations. When we design any
system or model, especially in AI, questions and answers are important since that is the primary way to
assess the presence of intelligence. But what becomes more important are our definitions and assumptions.
To supplement our definition of intelligence we provide the following cardinal assumption.
Assumption 3. The knowledge that has been accumulated over time is lesser than the knowledge that is yet
to gathered. With this assumption, an answer of “I Don’t Know” becomes not just a correct answer, but it is
an invitation to the person asking the question to teach the agent how to answer the question.
So the agent is always learning, and the reason is simply due to what we discussed before: we don’t know
most things and hence the learning usually never stops. If the person asking the question is not satisfied
14
with the answer, he or she now has a responsibility to teach the agent to improve upon the answer produced.
A failure to create intelligence in any agent is a failure on the part of the teacher in finding a teaching
methodology appropriate for the agent. This also implies that:
Criterion 2. Creating intelligence is not only about writing software code, it is about having the best teachers
that humanity has produced being available to teach the later generations, be it human or machines.
We now consider the fundamental question of whether we need complicated models or merely stronger
beliefs. We state this as our essential doctrine.
Criterion 3. The intelligent agent has to believe that it has the ability to learn and the confidence to request
lessons regarding answers that it is unable to generate satisfactorily.
Confidence, like intelligence, is an unintended consequence. We cannot find confidence directly or our
actions cannot become confident just by our choice to do so. To give an illustration, let us say, someone has
bad vision and they decide to walk around confidently. They might not only cause harm to themselves but
they are a disaster for everyone around them. To build confidence we need to seek clarity or we need to focus
our efforts on seeing things clearly. An admission of ignorance regarding something or acceptance that we
don’t know becomes a great possibility to know and marks the start of gaining confidence. As an unintended
consequence of our struggle to try and comprehend things around us better, we gradually become confident
as our understanding improves. Combining confidence, or our pains to pursue clarity, with the great answer,
“I don’t know”, which follows from our Assumption (3); we get a better answer, which is “let me try”.
When an agent is not learning it should ideally be teaching (other agents or anyone else). This is perhaps
because teaching and learning are highly interconnected and the best way to learn is to teach. A realization
that the roles of students and teachers are constantly getting interchanged, originates from a belief that
everyone has something to teach to everyone else. When we are teaching we are also learning from someone
else, when we are learning we are really teaching ourselves. To be clear, although, most of us probably know
this, learning does not just represent reading textbooks, or, doing assignments, though these are important
components of learning. Learning can happen when we are doing anything that we enjoy doing. This can be
built into the reward system of the agent, so that it accumulates points for aspects that it likes. Different
agents could be made to like different things, so that we build a random enjoyment component that learns
from different activities.
Hence, if any agent has to learn a lot (or everything really?), instead of trying to find the right teachers,
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we should make everyone its teacher. Since we have to respect our teachers, the agent now has to respect
everyone. A consequence of everyone becoming a teacher, and since the roles of teacher and student can
interchange, is that everyone also becomes everyone else’s student. And the result might be that everyone
will respect one another. Isn’t that one of the objectives, and perhaps an unintended consequence, of making
everyone intelligent?
Many times what we don’t know (or even when we are in a situation where we don’t know something)
can be scary or can cause confusion or frustration. Hence, efforts at learning and teaching, usually end
up confronting these two monsters: Confusion and Frustration, both of which though scary and ugly to
begin with, can be powerful motivators as long as we don’t let them bother us. Confusion is the beginning of
Understanding. Necessity is the mother of all creation / innovation / invention, but the often forgotten father
is Frustration, which is sometimes even more necessary than necessity herself. Simply put, some amount of
frustration can be highly stimulating and lead to great possibilities. What we learn from the story of, Beauty
and the Beast, (De Beaumont 1804; End-note 16), is that we need to love the beasts to find beauty. Hence,
if we start to love these monsters (Confusion and Frustration), we can unlock their awesomeness and find
truly stunning solutions.
Hence, our agent has to remain confident and ask questions when it does not have an answer. This can
also be stated as,
Solution 1. Life for an intelligent agent is all about having confidence and the right teachers and /or
students.
3.2 Acing the Turing Test
(Moor 1976) puts forth the argument that the real value of the imitation game (also known as the Turing
Test, TT, Turing 1950; End-note 17) lies not in treating it as the basis for an operational definition but
in considering it as a potential source of good inductive evidence for the hypothesis that machines think.
(French 1990) argues that the very capacity of the TT to probe the deepest, most essential areas of human
cognition makes it virtually useless as a real test for intelligence. (French 2000) chronicles the comments
and controversy surrounding the first fifty years of the TT, concluding that it will remain importance and
relevant to future generations of people living in a world in which the cognitive capacities of machines will
be vastly greater than they are now.
(Copeland 2000) suggests, based on unpublished material by Turing, that the Turing test withstands
objections that are popularly believed to be fatal. (Harnad 1992) shows that it is important to understand
that the TT is not, nor was it intended to be, a trick; how well one can fool someone is not a measure of
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scientific progress. The TT is an empirical criterion: It sets AI’s empirical goal to be to generate human scale
performance capacity. This goal will be met when the candidate’s performance is totally indistinguishable
from a human’s. Until then, the TT simply represents what it is that AI must endeavor eventually to
accomplish scientifically.
(Saygin, Cicekli & Akman 2000) conclude that the Turing Test has been, and will continue to be, an
influential and controversial topic. (Von Ahn, Blum & Langford 2004) discuss the Completely Automated
Public Turing Test to Tell Computers and Humans Apart, CAPTCHA, which is a automatically generated
test, which most humans can pass, but that current computer programs cannot pass. This is somewhat of
a paradox since a CAPTCHA is a program that can generate and grade tests that it itself cannot pass; this
finds application in many places on the internet to ensure that computer programs are not substituting for
humans.
An often omitted criteria that needs to be considered when administering the Turing test is the ability,
or, the level of skill of the person conducting the test. Surely, different individuals are satisfied with different
levels of impersonation. When we see any drama, play or movie that depicts the life of any real person, (while
reminding ourselves that movies might not be real, but real life can become movies); different people are
satisfied with different levels of acting ability. We all know, that the person playing the role in the theatrical
version is not the same as the person that is being enacted. But in many cases, (perhaps, in most cases, when
it is well produced), we leave feeling satisfied with the result of the replication. The lesson for us here is this:
how far does the test administrator need to go to believe that the computer program perfectly duplicates the
human test subject.
Our Definition (1) of intelligence implies that the benchmark for intelligence has been surpassed if the
question is answered to the satisfaction of the person administering the Turing test. In this context answering
a question is the decision making at display.
3.3 Imitation in the Imitation Game
Let us now consider another example of imitation in the imitation game, which was a recently released
movie about the role of Alan Turing in the second world war (Proudfoot 2015; You 2015; Guo 2015). The
actor in the movie, Benedict Cumberbatch (Porter 2014), does a sensational job portraying the real Alan
Turing (though this is a subjective evaluation, if someone disagrees, termed a disbeliever, then it would be fair
to state that they now have the responsibility of doing a better role play). To go into length on how Benedict
Cumberbatch (or any disbeliever, forced to turn into a better actor) accomplished this would require another
paper or a few books of their own (Hagen 1991; 2009 are masterpieces on how to be convincing actors). The
short answer would be that, an actor believes that he can play the part he is chosen to play, which is what
an agent chosen to display intelligence must first be made to believe. This is about not about dishonesty or
deception, it is about belief and confidence. As discussed in Section (3.1), true confidence comes when we
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admit we don’t know something and we are willing to try.
The manner in which Benedict Cumberbatch (End-notes 19; 20) plays the main character in the movie,
Imitation Game, leads us to state the Real Enigma of the Imitation Game as: Which Alan Turing is the More
Convincingly Brilliant Mathematician? This question merely inquires as to whether, Alan Turing or Benedict
Cumberbatch, would pass a stage test for actors who had to convince the audience they were mathematicians.
Anyone that would make the argument that acting like a mathematician does not make a real mathematician,
needs to be reminded that acting like a mathematician is the first step to being a mathematician. Once this
belief is instilled, time, familiarity with the steps and the notation related to mathematics, supplemented with
our road-map for intelligence (Section 4) will take care of creating real mathematicians. (Kashyap 2017b) is
an application of our curious and confident approach to creating intelligence in the financial markets.
3.4 Mexican Chihuahua solving Korean Puzzles under a Mush-Room
(Searle 1980) argued that the fact that machines can be devised to respond to input, with the same
output that a mind would give, does not mean that minds and machines are doing the same thing; for the
latter lacks understanding. (End-note 18) has a summary of Searle’s Chinese-Room thought experiment;
also, (Searle 1982; 1990; 2001; 2004) are later discussions; (Preston & Bishop 2002) has a collection of essays
on this crucial challenge. Searle was in fact against the notion of strong AI, which is that human minds are,
in essence computer programs. That is an appropriately programmed computer with the right inputs and
outputs, would thereby have a mind in exactly the same sense human beings have minds. All mental activity
is simply the carrying out of some well-defined sequence of operations, frequently referred to as an algorithm.
(Penrose 1989) claims that there are aspects of consciousness that cannot be replicated within any com-
puter model, no matter how sophisticated, as long as the model is based on an algorithm. He presents an
overview of the present state of physical understanding and tries to show that an important gap exists at the
point where, quantum and classical physics meet, as well as to speculate on how the conscious brain might
be taking advantage of whatever new physics is needed to fill this gap to achieve its non-algorithmic effects.
Searle’s example has had a profound impact on the discussions related to AI for the last many years.
However, as a counter argument, let us consider, instead of an American (John Searle) juggling with Chinese
characters, he has no clue about, in a closed room, using instructions in English, a language he understands;
what if it was a Mexican Chihuahua solving puzzles posed using Korean characters, sitting under a giant
Mush-Room. Perhaps having devoured the mushroom and hence being influenced by it in ways that we do not
quite yet comprehend, but for the purposes of this test the effects are only beneficial (for the hallucinogenic
effects of mushrooms see: Schwartz & Smith 1988; Samorini 1992; Musshoff, Madea & Beike 2000; Halpern
2004), and giving out the right answers back in the form of Korean characters, but only barking in response
to everything else.
Does it matter, whether the Chihuahua is only using certain training it has been given, to use rules to
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arrange Korean characters, or, whether it is the Mushroom causing the miracle or something else? For all
practical purposes, the Chihuahua is an intelligent creature, (since it is able to present the right set of Korean
characters as a solution to the puzzles or questions we pose), that simply does not speak the same language
as we do. We do not understand its barking nor does it understand the voice tones we produce, or maybe
it pretends that it does not understand. It can be argued, though we won’t continue this line of reasoning,
that we understand less of what dogs say, than what dogs understand of what we say; who is more intelligent
then? For simplicity and for rhetorical reasons, let us just say that the effects of the mushroom, last for as
long as the Chihuahua is alive, or, until we are still interested in asking it questions using Korean Characters?
To substantiate this counter viewpoint, does it really matter if we are simply using rules to solve a puzzle or
if we are actually understanding how the solution was arrived at, if we completely believe that we understand
the solution and merely use rules to arrive at the solution? This is not about being dishonest, or, passing lie
detector tests; since, if we believe we know the answer and if we are able to consistently generate the answer,
it does not matter how we got the answer; since we should now be deemed intelligent enough as we have come
up with the answers.
3.5 Merry-Go-Round of Trials, Errors and Revisions
Usually, on our first attempt to answer any question we may not get the correct, or, the best answer.
This is where the trial and error part kicks in. But once we start somewhere, we learn from our mistakes and
improve upon our explanations. In this Question & Answer context, we define any question as a good question
and a good answer as something that we only think of later or something we find after a few iterations of
trial and error.
(McCarthy & Hayes 1969) is a discussion of the main issues in philosophy that also arise in AI. John
MaCarthy, who is credited with coining the term “Artificial Intelligence” defined it as “the science and
engineering of making intelligent machines” (McCarthy 2004). (Beck & Arnold 1977) discuss this iterative
approach to estimate parameters used in Engineering and the Sciences. Many improvements in the sciences
and engineering happen through a series of refinements: (Wolfe 2005) is a discussion of how successive designs
of fighter planes, where a failure potentially meant the loss of life of the pilots, brought our incremental
improvements, which have now make possible the reality of space exploration; (End-note 21) is a mention by
Taleb of why it is important to create an environment where the errors are less costly, or, trial with small
errors are preferable. Though sometimes, errors are unavoidable as in plane crashes, which subsequently lead
to safer air travel for later passengers.
(Swanson 1977) recognizes the essential role of trial and error in accessing to scientific literature, pointing
the way toward improved information services illuminating potential inconsistencies that have beset many
retrieval exercises. This has strong implications for our knowledge store discussed in Section (8.3).
(Doidge 2007) presents classic cases from the frontiers of neuroscience that chronicle the biological changes
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happening in the brain driven by external impetuses, revealing that adapting to new circumstances and
learning to deal with adversity are almost hard wired into us. In essence what they reveal is that the brain
constantly changes as situations change, which tells us that what we need to contend with or mimic is a
moving target.
(Young 2009) is about trial and learning in a social or economic game theory setting (Gibbons 1992). A
person learns by trial and error if he occasionally tries out new strategies, rejecting choices that are, erroneous,
in the sense that they do not lead to higher payoffs. In an economic game, however, strategies can become
erroneous due to a change of behavior by someone else, triggering a search for new and better strategies. In
economics, it is insightful to establish conditions under which the Nash equilibrium property (Nash 1950)
can be established. But in real life equilibrium is a dynamic, constantly changing state (like a see-saw) due
to the subjectivity in all decision making and the differing perceptions of the individuals involved and hence
the trial and error never ceases.
Intelligence and learning also involve the ability to guess or the ability to make decisions when the best
choice is not exactly clear. Observed data can be consistent with many models, and therefore which model
is appropriate, given the data, is uncertain (Ghahramani 2015). Similarly, predictions about future data
and the future consequences of actions are uncertain. Probability theory provides a framework for modeling
uncertainty. A machine can use such models to make predictions about future data, and take decisions that
are rational given these predictions.
In all efforts at creating intelligence, we make an unstated assumption that human beings are capable
of intelligence. But, we are not born intelligent. It takes years of nurturing and tutoring for us to become
intelligent and we display different abilities and aptitude for different things, or the intelligence of different
individual could be in different skills. How could we then have expectations that something, that we deem
not to have the capacity for intelligence, has to become intelligent in a relatively short span of time. This
holds a strong message for us that, to create intelligence artificially, might require years of training for an
agent.
In a typical classroom some kids end up with more conventional forms of intelligence in comparison to
others and as assessed by our benchmark or measure, due to creating more connections and retaining the
relevant bits of information they receive. Using our Assumption (2), we can reword this as: in a world full
of intelligent human beings, only a handful of us become Albert Einsteins. Hence, we would expect a similar
sort of situation when trying to create AI, we need to start with a group of agents, with different parameters
and let them wander around and see what innate abilities they pick up. Accordingly, we need to further
those skills that were naturally acquired. The circle of trial, error and corrections needs to be happening
constantly.
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3.6 Gifts from the Realm of the Unintentional
(Fogel 2004) chronicles that infantile amnesia, the apparent loss of memory about one’s own infancy,
has been accepted as fact for at least a few thousand years. (Waldfogel 1948) reveals a serious gap in
our knowledge regarding childhood memories, though there seems to be an abundance of clinical evidence
regarding the fact that repressed childhood experiences may be significant for adult behavior. The evidence,
though plenty, cannot be constructed as proof of the universality or the predominance of infantile amnesia
due to the authenticity of the data used in these studies.
(Nadel & Zola-Morgan 1984) indicate that some memory systems in our body become functional at birth
or shortly thereafter, whereas others become active following a period of postnatal neurogenesis. Also, studies
have shown that localized brain damage typically leads to selective, rather than general, memory defects,
suggesting that, the postnatal maturation of a specific neural system, lies at the root of infantile amnesia.
(Howe & Courage 1993) conclude that infantile amnesia is a chimera of a previously unexplored relationship
between the development of a cognitive sense of self and the personalization of event memory. They examine
this hypothesis in the context of related developments in language and social cognition. (De Brigard 2014) is
a philosophical discussion of the phenomenon of remembering along with a historical perspective and reviews
of critical findings in the psychology and the neuroscience of remembering.
Despite the many unknown aspects of infantile amnesia, it is clear that the formative years of any human
being are not remembered. Perhaps, an unintended consequence of not knowing who we really were, before
we got a better idea of who we were becoming, is to reduce the confusion, as we learn to explore and form
a conception of what we are. Or, maybe, evolution only deemed worthy of remembering, only what we
remember, which is after we had a better idea of what was happening around us.
Also perhaps, the most important element of AI is to ignite curiosity within the agents, because, once
an agent gets inquisitive, learning happens almost by itself, after that. An unintended consequence can be
overconfidence and needs to be monitored for closely. At periodic intervals, the agent has to be corrected so
that positive learning is rewarded and mistakes are removed. To prevent the abuse of excessive intelligence,
perhaps, the teachers who train the agent also need to impart moral behavior and empathy towards the, so
called, less intelligent.
Success is, a very relative term. In the extreme case, which, we study a bit about, finance, one person’s
success (profit) could be someone else’s failure (loss). That being said, to triumph in creating AI and almost
everything else, it is important to know where we are, and start the journey towards, where we want to be.
An unintended consequence of taking the first step on a journey, means that the percentage of the distance
left to be traveled reduces from infinity to a finite number. So once we start the trip, it becomes manageable
immediately. The subjectivity in how we compare things means that the benchmark for AI will be constantly
changing, which means we need our agents to keep on learning, just as we need to do the same as well.
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A further glance in the direction of unintended consequences might show that in the process of creating
knowledge or intelligence, and trying to understand the world better or make it a better place, we might just
end up understanding one another better, perhaps, becoming more tolerant in the process, an unintended yet
very welcome consequence; making us wonder whether the the true purpose of all knowledge creation might
be to make us more tolerant.
As AI becomes tightly interwoven with many aspects of our daily lives, another unintended consequence
would be the many jobs that would no longer need any human intervention. While on the surface, this might
seem like a grave threat, this trend would force human beings to look inward into what truly makes them
human and realize the greater potential of their minds. This also highlights the key strength that we possess.
If we are able to formulate precise inputs to computers after a suitable encoding of the elements from any
environment, we cannot compete with machines in terms of calculation speed or memory, but what we can
perform better at this stage is to comprehend the situation better. This suggests that our advantage is being
able to figure out what the real problem or challenge is.
3.7 Evolutionary Tricks for the Empirics
Anyone reading this paper might have certain well founded reservations, regarding the theoretical and
conceptual connections outlined here, because of the apparent lack of empirical tests. For that, we would like
to point out that the present paper is based on millions of years of experimentation (Brooks 1991). This test,
which is still going on and which is still creating intelligence, is nothing but evolution. To replicate this test
might take another few millions years; but perhaps, it can be done using machines in a shorter time, though
it might still take a few years. This paper also provides the theoretical basis for many new empirical tests
and is based on one (or many?) continuous and complete empirical experiment(s) happening everywhere in
our cosmos.
As epitomized by the magical movie, Forrest Gump, (Groom 1986), Shit Happens, which can also be
interpreted as Life Happens. (Palmer 2002; Mandik 2007; Schudson 2007; Campos-Arceiz 2009) have a
discussion of shit happening, including perhaps both intended and unintended consequences, positive or
negative, depending on the viewpoint in sports, news, philosophy and everything else. This might imply to
us that the most intelligent organism that has been created, thus far, was not really created but it happened
because of mother nature’s trials and errors, also known as evolution. (Darwin 1859; Dawkins 1976; Eldredge
2005; Scott 2009) are a tiny collection of works on this phenomenal topic, starting from the pathfinder to
more recent views including debates on other possibilities.
As discussed in Section (3.5), this cycle of revisions is also at play in the numerous species that inhabit
our planet. A large avenue for future research would be to explore the level of intelligence in different kinds
of creatures and the extent to which they display the characteristics described here and perhaps be open
to other fundamental principles omitted here, since intelligence is also about being open to possibilities. It
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might also reveal that evolution and its twin sister, reproduction, are passing on genetic improvements geared
towards increased intelligence to later generations. Such studies rooted in the basics of biology might even
reveal bottlenecks to increasing intelligence based on the physical properties of any system. We just need to
keep reminding ourselves, that what happens is usually unintentional, but it just might bring about wonderful
consequences, once it happens, even if, some of us might only see the benefits, or, the impediments, at any
point in time.
4 A Road-Map for Intelligence
While a detailed axiomatic approach to uncertainty, unintended consequences and sapience is postponed
for another time, (or perhaps another lifetime), the present assortment can be summarized as the below “how
to guide for intellect”, or, a road-map of the essential elements required to create artificial intelligence. The
related concepts are elaborated in Sections (3.1; 3.2; 3.4; 3.5; 3.6) and linked to the corresponding items
below.
Each step in the following algorithm or pseudo-code can be tested as a separate scientific hypothesis; but
surely, greater the coherence between the components that encapsulate the below concepts better the intended
outcomes. Relevant evidence and technical aspects, including pointers to mathematical ingredients from Sec-
tion (8) and further references, are given in the corresponding points below.
While(Agent is Alive or The World has not Ended)
Begin
1. A language certification is necessary.
(a) From Assumption (1), we need to ensure that the agent can pick up advanced concepts by having
been certified that a certain minimum level of language abilities have been acquired. If a certain
threshold is not met in terms of language skills, it is back to the language classroom for this agent
(Condition 1). (Lightbown, Spada, Ranta & Rand 1999) is a comprehensive discussion on how
languages are learned, especially from the point of interest of classroom teachers.
(b) To be clear, the requirement from the agent can be something simple, like giving advice on a
financial strategy. In this case, the inputs can simply be the time series of numbers and the
output can be just a Buy, Sell or Hold indication, since all of finance through time has involved
only these three simple outcomes. The complications are mostly to get to these three results,
which the agent can conjure up in its own way. But its interface with the external world, need not
be anything too involved.
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(c) On the other extreme, if we wish to create agents that are mathematicians, we would need a precise
representation of mathematical rules and results using explicitly clear notation and terminology.
Both the input and output have to adhere to exactly defined and rigorous statements. The language
in this case becomes a sequence of steps that flow from the preceding one to the subsequent one
using the rules of mathematics or already established results or based on logical arguments. To
begin with, we only need to capture basic operations in mathematics and more advanced results
will be connected to the basic results using fundamental rules or results already established. As
discussed in Section (2), breeding true intelligence requires us to transcend artificial domains
created by us, such as finance or mathematics; but to make the problem of implementation more
manageable, focusing on simplified language requirements specific to any field is prudent.
2. A formal model that collects new pieces of information from the various possible choices
(a) We model collection of information, using the Bass Model of Diffusion (Bass 1969; Mahajan
1985; Mahajan, Muller & Bass 1991; Bass, Krishnan & Jain 1994; Michalakelis, Varoutas &
Sphicopoulos 2010; Jiang & Jain 2012; End-notes 22; Section 8.2) which is used extensively in
marketing to study the adoption of new products. We view a new product being adopted by
someone as being equivalent to the agent collecting the adopter. The person that just got newly
adopted by the product is the new piece of information from the perspective of our model of
information collection. Collecting new pieces of information is how we mimic curiosity in our
agents. New models of curiosity would benefit immensely from suggestions on how to develop
children to be lifelong learners and to nurture the scientist within all kids (Calkins & Bellino 1997;
Ramey-Gassert 1997; Gamble & Cota-Robles 2015; End-note 26). Here, we use illustrate with the
two opposite ends of the spectrum mentioned in Step (1). The new piece of information could be a
new time series of financial data if our requirement is related to finance, based on the expectation
that the agent has to give advice on a financial strategy. The new piece of information could be
a new mathematical result if our requirement is mathematical, based on the expectation that we
wish to create mathematicians.
3. A collection of agents that pick different pieces of information using the collector model
(a) This is simply a group of agents with different parameters of innovation and adoption for the
Bass Model of diffusion (Section 8.2). We could also use many developments in the use of models
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of curiosity (Sato, Takeuchi & Okude 2011 present an experience-based curiosity model which
indicates individual’s real time curiosity within a city regarding how well the individual knows
the city. It aims to understand individual’s real time interests by not relying on information
the people input intentionally, but by understanding behavior data, done through environmental
sensing from mobile devices that are capable of sensing the environment around the individual
and not necessarily by interacting with the people directly).
4. A belief instilled in the agent that it/he/she is intelligent
(a) This has been captured in Criterion (3) and Condition (1). To elaborate, confidence in one’s
abilities generally enhances motivation, making it a valuable asset for individuals with imperfect
willpower (Bénabou & Tirole 2002). For this the agent has to be an actor, believing that it can play
the part of someone who is intelligent. There is a vast literature on the importance of self-confidence
and its relation to performance in different fields such as sports and language acquisition: (Feltz
1988; Clément, Dörnyei, & Noels 1994; Noels, Pon, & Clément 1996). An overemphasis on global
self-esteem is perhaps not ideal and (Owens 1993) discusses the implications for understanding the
differential impact of negative and positive self-evaluations on emotional and social well-being.
5. A measure to judge how closely the new information collected matches the information already stored
(a) To aid in this effort to extract meaning from chaos, we summarize the application of the theoretical
results from (Kashyap 2017a) to AI studies. The central concept rests on a novel methodology
based on the marriage between the Bhattacharyya distance, a measure of similarity across distri-
butions, and the Johnson Lindenstrauss Lemma, a technique for dimension reduction, providing
us with a simple yet powerful tool that allows comparisons between data-sets representing any
two distributions, perhaps also becoming, to our limited knowledge, an example of perfect matri-
mony (Sections 8.4; 8.5). This methodology is also necessary to assess how similar newly gathered
information is to the knowledge store that we already have (Section 8.3).
(b) A subtle point here is that if we keep receiving, or collecting, the same information multiple times,
the degree of similarity of the newly received information with the information we have already col-
lected, condensed (dimension reduced) and stored will increase over subsequent iterations. Hence
after a few rounds of certain information being repeatedly received, it will be stored almost in
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its entirety. This captures the fundamental principle of how learning happens by repetition. The
specific implementation models will need to fine tune the number of times something is received
before most of it is retained, but at a high level this crucial concept has to happen. This also
tells us that the more often some information is being received, the more important it is and
the more completely it needs to be stored. The case where we need a lot of precision is for any
new mathematical result, which has to be an exact combination of fundamental rules or already
established results.
6. A method to keep reducing the information store so that less (and the most essential) data, only almost
a summary, needs to be maintained
(a) Any existing variance reduction (Shlens 2014 is about Principal Component Analysis) or compres-
sion technique (Lynch 1985; Storer 1988) can be used or the method from Step (5), can be used
as well to reduce the data store to a smaller dimension.
7. A regular period of deep sleep.
(a) The importance of sleep in human beings in not fully understood, but it is beyond debate that sleep
is essential and has numerous benefits (Robertson, Pascual-Leone & Press 2004; Ellenbogen 2005;
Blischke, Erlacher, Kresin, Brueckner & Malangré 2008; Aly & Moscovitch 2010; Nere, Hashmi,
Cirelli & Tononi 2013). Any agent requires a period of sleep, where the Steps (5; 6) are carried out
without any other external disturbances, so its confidence is not shaken and this belief in itself, or,
himself, or, herself, is not destroyed (Step 4). This can suggest a hypothesis that, what happens
during our sleep might be that our creators (Mother Nature or Evolution or Whatever), might be
giving suggestions to us in our sleep and these pointers for a better life, (or greater intelligence, or,
whatever their purpose, might be), might manifest themselves as dreams. The Steps (5; 6) can be
done in the background while the agent is not necessarily asleep, but a period of complete focus
on the above two steps might be helpful.
End // The While Loop Ends Here, but it must go on Forever
The formal mathematical elements are discussed in Section (8). These quantitative measures can be
applied across aggregations of smaller elements that can aid the AI agent by providing simple yet power-
26
ful metrics to compare groups of entities and add to its knowledge store. The results draw upon sources
from statistics, probability, marketing, economics / finance, communication systems, pattern recognition and
information theory; becoming an example of how elements of different fields can be combined to provide
answers to the questions raised by a particular field.
5 Conclusions and Possibilities for Future Research
We have discussed the intuition for why we also need the best teachers and not just the best computing
science designers to create artificial intelligence. An unintended consequence of establishing curiosity and
confidence in an agent, expected to become intelligent, might well be intelligence. We have considered why,
even though we wish to create intelligence and make the agent pass tests of intelligence, the gift of intelligence
might be something from the realm of the unintentional; We have provided the mathematical tools and formal
elements of what such an endeavor might require, which includes models of diffusion, distance measures and
dimension reduction, among other things.
1. The possibilities for what improvements are necessary are endless, since we are just beginning. But
once we instill confidence in the agent that has to become intelligent, it can ask the questions to learn
better answers; that is we try something, observe the mistakes and make corrections depending on the
level of progress we deem satisfactory.
2. Another important aspect is to try to establish intelligence in simpler real life applications and then
take the lessons to the more complex design of a completely autonomous intelligent creature. There is
a lot of activity, in this space, on many individual fronts. We could start with the financial markets,
doing rudimentary household tasks, driving etc. (all of which are happening), but combining the trial
and errors from all of these experiences are essential toward our greater goal of AI. It would be helpful
to start with the existing level of understanding and the latest developments in text parsing, speech
recognition, and so on. As we put these parts together, the loop of trying and learning from mistakes
has to continue forever (or for a very long time).
3. As the likelihood of having to co-exist with so called artificially created intelligent beings increases,
we will need to learn to be tolerant and focus on what truly makes us human and realize the greater
potential of our existence.
(Nilsson 2006) argues for the development of general-purpose, educable systems that can learn and be taught
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to perform any of the thousands of jobs that humans can perform, rather than work toward the goal of
automation by building special-purpose systems; but the message we put forth is that the lessons from
seemingly trivial tasks need to be weaved towards higher ambitions; (Russell, Dewey & Tegmark 2015)
has some examples for further areas of research in building intelligent agents; (Bottou 2014) suggests that
instead of trying to bridge the gap between machine learning systems and sophisticated “all-purpose” inference
mechanisms, we can instead algebraically enrich the set of manipulations applicable to training systems, and
build reasoning capabilities from the ground up.
(Lake, Ullman, Tenenbaum & Gershman 2017) review progress in cognitive science, suggesting that truly
human-like learning and thinking machines will have to reach beyond current engineering trends in both
what they learn and how they learn it. Specifically, they argue that these machines should build causal
models of the world (including intuitive theories of physics and psychology) that support explanation and
understanding, rather than merely solving pattern recognition problems. (Yannakakis & Togelius 2015) give
a high-level overview of the field of artificial and computational intelligence in games. (Chesani, Mello &
Milano 2017) propose to solve mathematical puzzles by means of computers, starting from text and diagrams
describing them, without any human intervention.
The limited success in creating artificial intelligence (in machines, humans and elsewhere), as of today,
is due to fundamental limitations with the current thinking and the absence of certain basic principles in the
majority of attempts in this space right now. There are numerous journals, articles and scientific efforts aimed
at creating artificial intelligence. The limited success can be attributed to many building blocks of intelligence
being absent in those efforts. This paper seeks to provide the foundational elements for intelligence and
addresses the drawback with the present efforts. Hence, the basic ideas outlined in the paper will and should
be of interest to anyone interested in creating intelligence. While it is tempting to view the topics presented
here as being extremely diverse, we need to remind ourselves that many instances of what we appreciate as
intelligence is a result of a demonstrated link between seemingly disparate elements from wide ranging themes;
not to mention, as discussed in the introduction (Section 2), the disciplinary boundaries we have created are
artificial. For intelligence to happen such unnecessary barriers have to be broken down.
Surely, one paper cannot completely accomplish the task where millions of other efforts have failed; but
what it can hope to do is guide future efforts to areas that will lead to greater success, inspired by how
intelligence perhaps happens in us. That being said, a road-map which can act as an algorithm and also a
set of hypothesis that can be tested and implemented computationally are provided. Just because we (readers
/ reviewers / students) do not see a connection or do not understand something, does not mean there is
no connection or nothing to be understood. This paper puts forth the suggestion that in such cases when
something is not clear, to increase intelligence, we need to ask questions and relate it to what we already
know. Otherwise, intelligence will not increase. This message is constantly espoused in classrooms worldwide,
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but when we deem ourselves above that, whatever our role in the intelligence creation eco-system, we have
stopped to learn. This paper is as much about intelligence in humans as in machines. Intelligence happens
as an unintended consequence due to curiosity left free. If something seems irrelevant, then we have stopped
being curious and the level of intelligence plateaus off.
We have a great example of intelligent beings that have been created, which is us. We could debate as to
whether this creator is evolution or an intelligent designer. But until higher powers intervene and provide the
ultimate solution to create intelligence, we have to make do with marginal methods exemplified by curiously
confident, trials and errors, such as this composition puts forth.
As we wait for the perfect solution, it is worth meditating upon what superior beings would do when
faced with a complex situation, such as the one we are in. It is said that the Universe is but the Brahma’s
(Creator’s) dream (Barnett 1907; Ramamurthi 1995; Ghatage 2010). Research (Effort / Struggle) can help
us understand this world and maybe decipher the key to intelligent agents; Sleep (Ease / Peace of Mind) can
help us create our own world; surely, creating intelligent beings would be a much smaller part of this new
world (and reminding ourselves that sleep has many direct benefits to increase cognitive abilities). We just
need to be mindful that the most rosy and well intentioned dreams can have unintended consequences and
turn to nightmares (Nolan 2010; Lehrer 2010; Kashyap 2016).
Native to Australia (Clark 1993; End-note 25), “Koalas spend about 4.7 hours eating, 4 minutes traveling,
4.8 hours resting while awake and 14.5 hours sleeping in a 24-hour period” - (Nagy & Martin 1985; Smith
1979; Moyal 2008). The benefits of yoga on sleep quality are well documented (Cohen, Warneke, Fouladi,
Rodriguez & Chaoul-Reich 2004; Khalsa 2004; Manjunath & Telles 2005; Chen, Chen, Chao, Hung, Lin &
Li 2009; Vera, Manzaneque, Maldonado, Carranque, Rodriguez, Blanca & Morell 2009; End-note 24).
A lesson from close by and down under: We need to “Do Some Yoga and Sleep Like A Koala”.
6 End-notes
1. Changing D&A which gives rise to different Q&A might even be telling us that Q&A and D&A might
be in our very DNA, the biological one, which are always changing (Alberts, Johnson, Lewis, Raff,
Roberts & Walter 2002; End-notes 2; 3).
2. Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is a molecule composed of two chains (made of nucleotides) that coil
around each other to form a double helix carrying the genetic instructions used in the growth, de-
velopment, functioning, and reproduction of all known living organisms and many viruses. DNA and
ribonucleic acid (RNA) are nucleic acids; alongside proteins, lipids and complex carbohydrates (polysac-
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charides), nucleic acids are one of the four major types of macromolecules that are essential for all known
forms of life. DNA, Wikipedia Link
3. Maybe, DNA hold the lessons from the lives of every ancestor we have ever had. Evolution is constantly
coding the information, compressing it and passing forward, what is needed to survive better and to
thrive, building what is essential right into our genes. For information storage in DNA and related
applications see: Church, Gao & Kosuri 2012; Lutz, ... , & Sawamoto 2013; Kosuri & Church 2014;
Roy, ... , & Lutz 2015.
4. A frame of mind and approach to seeking knowledge that is open to the methods of both science and
art could be termed, Science without Borders but Combined with the Arts.
5. Universal Computing Machine, Wikipedia Link In computer science, a universal Turing machine (UTM)
is a Turing machine (Minsky 1967; End-note 6) that can simulate an arbitrary Turing machine on ar-
bitrary input. The universal machine essentially achieves this by reading both the description of the
machine to be simulated as well as the input thereof from its own tape.
6. Turing Machine, Wikipedia Link A Turing machine is a mathematical model of computation that de-
fines an abstract machine, which manipulates symbols on a strip of tape according to a table of rules.
Despite the model’s simplicity, given any computer algorithm, a Turing machine capable of simulating
that algorithm’s logic can be constructed (Sipser 2006).
7. Computer, Wikipedia Link A computer is a device that can be instructed to carry out sequences of
arithmetic or logical operations automatically via computer programming.
8. MAC or Macintosh, Wikipedia Link The Macintosh (pronounced as MAK-in-tosh; branded as Mac
since 1998) is a family of personal computers designed, manufactured, and sold by Apple Inc. since
January 1984.
9. Personal Computer, Wikipedia Link A personal computer (PC) is a multi-purpose computer whose
size, capabilities, and price make it feasible for individual use.
10. MAC vs MPC, Wikipedia Link Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corporation, was a copyright
infringement lawsuit in 1994 in which Apple Computer, Inc. (now Apple Inc.) sought to prevent
Microsoft and Hewlett-Packard from using visual graphical user interface (GUI) elements that were
similar to those in Apple’s Lisa and Macintosh operating systems. Mac vs PC also refers to the rivalry
between the two companies to dominate the personal computer market.
11. History Computing, Wikipedia Link The history of computing is longer than the history of computing
hardware and modern computing technology and includes the history of methods intended for pen and
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paper or for chalk and slate, with or without the aid of tables.
12. Computing Platform, Wikipedia Link A computing platform or digital platform is the environment in
which a piece of software is executed. It may be the hardware or the operating system (OS), even a
web browser and associated application programming interfaces, or other underlying software, as long
as the program code is executed with it.
13. Cloud Computing, Wikipedia Link Cloud computing is shared pools of configurable computer system
resources and higher-level services that can be rapidly provisioned with minimal management effort,
often over the Internet. Cloud computing relies on sharing of resources to achieve coherence and
economies of scale, similar to a public utility.
14. Quantum Computing, Wikipedia Link Quantum computing is computing using quantum-mechanical
phenomena, such as superposition and entanglement. A quantum computer is a device that performs
quantum computing. Such a computer is different from binary digital electronic computers based on
transistors. Whereas common digital computing requires that the data be encoded into binary digits
(bits), each of which is always in one of two definite states (0 or 1), quantum computation uses quantum
bits or qubits, which can be in superpositions of states.
15. To illustrate the grammatical ambiguities that exist (persist?) in many modern languages, consider
this example: “A mother beats up her daughter because she was drunk”. So, who was the drunk person
in this incident? Mother Beats Daughter, English Language Learners Link
16. Beauty and the Beast (French: La Belle et la Bête) is a fairy tale written by French novelist Gabrielle-
Suzanne Barbot de Villeneuve and published in 1740 in The Young American and Marine Tales (French:
La Jeune Américaine et les contes marins). Her lengthy version was abridged, rewritten, and published
first by Jeanne-Marie Leprince de Beaumont in 1756. Beauty and the Beast, Wikipedia Link
17. Turing Test, Wikipedia Link The Turing test, developed by Alan Turing in 1950, is a test of a machine’s
ability to exhibit intelligent behavior equivalent to, or indistinguishable from, that of a human. Turing
proposed that a human evaluator would judge natural language conversations between a human and a
machine designed to generate human-like responses. The evaluator would be aware that one of the two
partners in conversation is a machine, and all participants would be separated from one another. The
conversation would be limited to a text-only channel such as a computer keyboard and screen so the
result would not depend on the machine’s ability to render words as speech (Turing originally suggested
a teleprinter, one of the few text-only communication systems available in 1950). If the evaluator cannot
reliably tell the machine from the human, the machine is said to have passed the test. The test does
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not check the ability to give correct answers to questions, only how closely answers resemble those a
human would give.
18. Searle’s Chinese room thought experiment, Wikipedia Link Searle’s thought experiment begins with
this hypothetical premise: suppose that artificial intelligence research has succeeded in constructing
a computer that behaves as if it understands Chinese. It takes Chinese characters as input and, by
following the instructions of a computer program, produces other Chinese characters, which it presents
as output. Suppose, says Searle, that this computer performs its task so convincingly that it comfortably
passes the Turing test: it convinces a human Chinese speaker that the program is itself a live Chinese
speaker. To all of the questions that the person asks, it makes appropriate responses, such that any
Chinese speaker would be convinced that they are talking to another Chinese-speaking human being.
This was originally phrased as: Searle supposes that he is in a closed room and has a book with
an English version of the computer program, along with sufficient paper, pencils, erasers, and filing
cabinets. Searle could receive Chinese characters through a slot in the door, process them according to
the program’s instructions, and produce Chinese characters as output.
The question Searle wants to answer is this: does the machine literally "understand" Chinese? Or is it
merely simulating the ability to understand Chinese? Searle calls the first position "strong AI" and the
latter "weak AI". Searle writes that "according to Strong AI, the correct simulation really is a mind.
According to Weak AI, the correct simulation is a model of the mind." He also writes: "On the Strong
AI view, the appropriately programmed computer does not just simulate having a mind; it literally has
a mind."
19. Most people when posed the question: “Is Benedict Cumberbatch a mathematician of extraordinary
ability?”, would answer in the negative. This answer comes about, without most of us having met him,
or, knowing whether he has been studying mathematics secretly for years but not having obtained any
formal degree in the field; again highlighting, how we jump to conclusions. Unlikely as it seems, it is
still probabilistically possible that he might be an exemplary mathematician. It is worth pointing out
that most of us have this belief about Mr. Cumberbatch, without even knowing what his educational
background is; though in this case, there are no surprises since, a quick search on Wikipedia or Google
Benedict Cumberbatch, WIkipedia Link will reveal that his many years of formal training have been
in acting.
20. Certain six year old’s that we know when questioned, “How to make computers intelligent?”, responded
by saying - “Have two computers; Use Google on one computer to find the answer and make the other
computer use this answer”. This remark gives us assurance that the concepts put forth in this paper
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about the way children learn by being curious, confident and most importantly by imitating good
role models while attempting to solve problems, without getting frazzled, hold the key to increased
intelligence.
21. Nassim Taleb and Daniel Kahneman discuss Trial and Error / IQ Points, among other things, at the New York Public Library on Feb 5, 2013.
As Taleb explains, “it is trial with small errors that leads to progress”. That being said, if there are big
errors that might incapacitate the person trying the trial from further trials; as long as someone else
has observed the attempts with huge errors, the rest of society benefits from it; assuming, of course,
that the big blow up has left a non-trivial portion of society intact, or at-least not too shaken up.
This concept is also illustrated above (Point 2) about learning from the lessons history holds for us.
(Ismail 2014) mentions the following quote from Taleb, “Knowledge gives you a little bit of an edge, but
tinkering (trial and error) is the equivalent of 1000 IQ points. It is tinkering that allowed the industrial
revolution”. This means that to match trial and error we need 1000 IQ points. But trial and error could
still give the wrong outcomes. We can try and fail many times and still be wrong. So in our paper we
make the assumption that we need 2000 IQ points to consistently make the right decisions. The subtle
point that arises from this discussion is that: we need 2000 IQ points to be right all the time, but the
problem is that the best of us has less than 200 IQ points. So Albert Einstein is nothing but a retard.
Let us let this sink in; if Einstein is retarded we have no hope. So how do we deal with such hopeless
retards? Should we not be more tolerant and considerate? Is it right to hold grudges against retards?
Would it not be the right thing to try to be helpful the next time we see any retards, which is any
human being.
22. Bass Model of Diffusion, Wikipedia Link The Bass Model or Bass Diffusion Model was developed by
Frank Bass. It consists of a simple differential equation that describes the process of how new products
get adopted in a population. The model presents a rationale of how current adopters and potential
adopters of a new product interact. The basic premise of the model is that adopters can be classified as
innovators or as imitators and the speed and timing of adoption depends on their degree of innovative-
ness and the degree of imitation among adopters. The Bass model has been widely used in forecasting,
especially new products’ sales forecasting and technology forecasting. Mathematically, the basic Bass
diffusion is a Riccati equation (End-note 23) with constant coefficients.
23. Riccati Equation, Wikipedia Link In mathematics, a Riccati equation in the narrowest sense is any
first-order ordinary differential equation that is quadratic in the unknown function. In other words, it
is an equation of the form
y′(x) = q0(x) + q1(x) y(x) + q2(x) y
2(x)
where q0(x) 6= 0 and q2(x) 6= 0. If q0(x) = 0 the equation reduces to a Bernoulli equation, while if
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q2(x) = 0 the equation becomes a first order linear ordinary differential equation. The equation is
named after Jacopo Riccati (1676–1754) (see Riccati 1724).
24. Yoga, Wikipedia Link Yoga is a group of physical, mental, and spiritual practices which originated in
ancient India.
25. Australia or Down Under, Wikipedia Link The term Down Under is a colloquialism which is variously
construed to refer to Australia and New Zealand.
26. Tips on Nurturing Your Child’s Curiosity The more curious a child is, the more he learns. Nurturing
your child’s curiosity is one of the most important ways you can help her become a lifelong learner.
Babies are born learners, with a natural curiosity to figure out how the world works. Curiosity is the
desire to learn. It is an eagerness to explore, discover and figure things out.
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8 Appendix: From Words to Symbols, A Curious and Confident
Model of Intellect
The mathematical concepts discussed in this appendix are utilized in Section (4). Each sub-section below
is employed in different steps of the algorithm given in Section (4). Elaborate explanations are also provided
in Section (4) and the corresponding road-map (and also linked into the narrative throughout the article)
regarding how the below mathematical components are necessary for the incubation of intelligence.
8.1 Notation and Terminology for Key Results
• DBC (pi, p′i), the Bhattacharyya Distance between two multinomial populations each consisting of k
categories classes with associated probabilities p1, p2, ..., pk and p′1, p
′
2, ..., p
′
k respectively.
• ρ (pi, p′i), the Bhattacharyya Coefficient.
• DBC−N(p, q) is the Bhattacharyya distance between p and q normal distributions or classes.
• DBC−MN (p1, p2) is the Bhattacharyya distance between two multivariate normal distributions, p1,p2
where pi ∼ N (µi, Σi).
• DBC−TN (p, q) is the Bhattacharyya distance between p and q truncated normal distributions or classes.
• DBC−TMN (p1, p2) is the Bhattacharyya distance between two truncated multivariate normal distribu-
tions, p1,p2 where pi ∼ N (µi, Σi, ai, bi).
• F (t), is the installed base fraction with respect to the adoption of a new product in a population.
• f (t), is the change of the installed base fraction or the likelihood of purchase at time t of a new product
i.e. f(t) =
d
dt
F (t).
• p, is the coefficient of innovation with respect to the adoption of a new product in a population.
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• q, is the coefficient of imitation with respect to the adoption of a new product in a population.
• Sales (or new adopters) S (t) at time t is the rate of change of installed base, that is, f (t) multiplied
by the ultimate market potential m.
8.2 Bass Model of Diffusion for Information Accumulation
Collecting new pieces of information is the behavioral parallel we draw to creating curiosity in our agents.
One of the simplest forms of the Bass model and also the original one from the pioneer (Bass 1969) can be
written as,
f (t)
1− F (t) = p+ qF (t)
F (t) =
∫ t
0
f (u)du
Here,
f (t), is the change of the installed base fraction or the likelihood of purchase at time t.
F (t), is the installed base fraction.
p, is the coefficient of innovation.
q, is the coefficient of imitation.
Sales S (t) at time t is the rate of change of installed base (i.e. adoption), that is, f (t) multiplied by the
ultimate market potential m. This is given by,
S (t) = mf (t)
S (t) = m
(p+ q)
2
p
e−(p+q)t(
1 + q
p
e−(p+q)t
)2
(Niu 2002) is a stochastic formulation of the Bass model of new product diffusion. As alternative models,
we could use models used in economics for the spread of rumors (Banerjee 1993 has a discussion of information
transmission processes, which for our purposes are similar to information collection processes) and herd
behavior. (Banerjee 1992) a sequential decision model in which each decision maker looks at the decisions
made by previous decision makers in taking her own decision, showing that the decision rules that are chosen
by optimizing individuals will be characterized by herd behavior; i.e., people will be doing what others are
doing rather than using their information.
8.3 Knowledge Store
We could use the developments in the field of text parsing and storing (Piskorski & Neumann 2000;
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Jacobs 2014), to create keyword based database(s), to hold bits of learning that the agent has gathered. The
knowledge store has to be processed periodically to establish and reestablish the connections between the
different stored elements. This feature would be of assistance in being able to recollect what has been learnt.
The connections are established based on the Bhattacharyya distance discussed next, and when appropriate,
we use dimension reduction techniques so that this distance measure could be applied (For intelligent database
systems and related query developments, see: Tahani 1977; Tou, Williams, Fikes, Henderson Jr, & Malone
1982; Parsaye & Chignell 1993).
8.4 Bhattacharyya Distance for Information Comparison
We use the Bhattacharyya distance (Bhattacharyya 1943, 1946) as a measure of similarity or dissimilarity
between the probability distributions of the two entities we are looking to compare. These entities could be
two information sources, two securities, groups of securities, markets or any statistical populations that we are
interested in studying. The Bhattacharyya distance is defined as the negative logarithm of the Bhattacharyya
coefficient.
DBC (pi, p
′
i) = − ln [ρ (pi, p′i)]
The Bhattacharyya coefficient is calculated as shown below for discrete and continuous probability distribu-
tions.
ρ (pi, p
′
i) =
k∑
i
√
pip
′
i
ρ (pi, p
′
i) =
∫ √
pi (x) p′i (x)dx
Bhattacharyya’s original interpretation of the measure was geometric (Derpanis 2008). He considered two
multinomial populations each consisting of k categories classes with associated probabilities p1, p2, ..., pk and
p′1, p
′
2, ..., p
′
k respectively. Then, as
∑k
i pi = 1 and
∑k
i p
′
i = 1, he noted that (
√
p1, ...,
√
pk) and (
√
p′1, ...,
√
p′k)
could be considered as the direction cosines of two vectors in k−dimensional space referred to a system of
orthogonal co-ordinate axes. As a measure of divergence between the two populations Bhattacharyya used
the square of the angle between the two position vectors. If θ is the angle between the vectors then:
ρ (pi, p
′
i) = cosθ =
k∑
i
√
pip
′
i
Thus if the two populations are identical: cosθ = 1 corresponding to θ = 0, hence we see the intuitive
motivation behind the definition as the vectors are co-linear. Bhattacharyya further showed that by passing
to the limiting case a measure of divergence could be obtained between two populations defined in any way
given that the two populations have the same number of variates. The value of coefficient then lies between
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0 and 1.
0 ≤ ρ (pi, p′i) ≤= 1
0 ≤ DBC (pi, p′i) ≤ ∞
We get the following formulae (Lee & Bretschneider 2012) for the Bhattacharyya distance when applied to
the case of two uni-variate normal distributions.
DBC−N(p, q) =
1
4
ln
(
1
4
(
σ2p
σ2q
+
σ2q
σ2p
+ 2
))
+
1
4
(
(µp − µq)2
σ2p + σ
2
q
)
σp is the variance of the p−th distribution,
µp is the mean of the p−th distribution, and
p, q are two different distributions.
The original paper on the Bhattacharyya distance (Bhattacharyya 1943) mentions a natural extension
to the case of more than two populations. For an M population system, each with k random variates, the
definition of the coefficient becomes,
ρ (p1, p2, ..., pM ) =
∫
· · ·
∫
[p1 (x) p2 (x) ...pM (x)]
1
M dx1 · · · dxk
For two multivariate normal distributions, p1,p2 where pi ∼ N (µi, Σi),
DBC−MN (p1, p2) =
1
8
(µ1 − µ2)TΣ−1(µ1 − µ2) +
1
2
ln
(
detΣ√
detΣ1 detΣ2
)
,
µi and Σi are the means and covariances of the distributions, and Σ =
Σ1+Σ2
2 . We need to keep in
mind that a discrete sample could be stored in matrices of the form A and B, where, n is the number of
observations and m denotes the number of variables captured by the two matrices.
Am×n ∼ N (µ1,Σ1)
Bm×n ∼ N (µ2,Σ2)
8.5 Dimension Reduction before Information Comparison
A key requirement to apply the Bhattacharyya distance in practice is to have data-sets with the same
number of dimensions. (Fodor 2002; Burges 2009; Sorzano, Vargas & Montano 2014) are comprehensive
collections of methodologies aimed at reducing the dimensions of a data-set using Principal Component
Analysis or Singular Value Decomposition and related techniques. (Johnson & Lindenstrauss 1984) proved
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a fundamental result (JL Lemma) that says that any n point subset of Euclidean space can be embedded in
k = O(log n
ǫ2
) dimensions without distorting the distances between any pair of points by more than a factor of
(1± ǫ), for any 0 < ǫ < 1. Whereas principal component analysis is only useful when the original data points
are inherently low dimensional, the JL Lemma requires absolutely no assumption on the original data. Also,
note that the final data points have no dependence on d, the dimensions of the original data which could live
in an arbitrarily high dimension. We use the version of the bounds for the dimensions of the transformed
subspace given in (Frankl & Maehara 1988; 1990; Dasgupta & Gupta 1999).
Lemma 1. For any 0 < ǫ < 1 and any integer n, let k be a positive integer such that
k ≥ 4
(
ǫ2
2
− ǫ
3
3
)−1
lnn
Then for any set V of n points in Rd, there is a map f : Rd → Rk such that for all u, v ∈ V ,
(1− ǫ) ‖u− v‖2 ≤ ‖f (u)− f (v) ‖2 ≤ (1 + ǫ) ‖u− v‖2
Furthermore, this map can be found in randomized polynomial time and one such map is f = 1√
k
Ax where,
x ∈ Rd and A is a k × d matrix in which each entry is sampled i.i.d from a Gaussian N (0, 1) distribution.
(Kashyap 2017a) provides expressions for the density functions after dimension transformation when con-
sidering log normal distributions, truncated normal and truncated multivariate normal distributions (Norstad
1999; Horrace 2005; Kiani, Panaretos, Psarakis & Saleem 2008; Yang 2008; Burkardt 2014). These results
are applicable in the context of many variables observed in real life such as stock prices, heart rates, inven-
tory levels, and volatilities, which do not take on negative values. We also require the expression for the
dimension transformed normal distribution, and possibly techniques for numerical approximations, since the
normal cumulative distribution (Zogheib & Hlynka 2009; Soranzo & Epure 2014) is a better candidate to
model a reward variable, which could take on negative values. Error function approximations are also helpful
choices (Cody 1969; Chiani, Dardari & Simon 2003). A relationship between co-variance (Stein 1973; 1981;
Kimeldorf & Sampson 1973; Rubinstein 1973; 1976; Kattumannil 2009; Teerapabolarn 2013) and distance
measures is also derived. We point out that these mathematical concepts have many uses outside the domain
of artificial intelligence.
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